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Abstract  
This paper deals with the role of the State Owned enterprises (SOEs) in innovation 
processes. Only a few studies focus on the contribution SOEs as companies might give to 
produce new knowledge and technological innovation. We argue, however, that SOEs are a 
pillar of the innovation process and we explore conditions that can make SOEs very effective. 
Through two in-depth case studies in two different industries (STMicroelectronics in 
the semiconductor and Thales Alenia Space in the space industry) we illustrate how SOEs 
can contribute to innovation by exploring new opportunities and recombining different 
sources of knowledge. We highlight the conditions that can make exploration and 
recombination possible. We also highlight the ability of the two companies to change their 
boundaries through a continuous wave of agreements, mergers and acquisitions. This way, 
they were able to expand beyond their domains in a way that matched the evolution of their 
original industries.  
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1. Introduction 
 
State Owned enterprises (henceforth SOEs) were and still are a pillar of several 
economies and, at the same time, a key issue in the debate among scholars, as well as 
practitioners and politicians. Their role is well documented both in mature and developing 
countries (Christiansen, 2011; Kowalski, 2013). For instance, SOEs contributed to the post-
war development in Western economies, accounting for a large share of GDP. Similarly, 
SOEs are crucial in developing countries, as in the case of Russia and China, among others 
(Girma et al., 2009; Gershman et al., 2016). The presence of SOEs in mature and developing 
economies varies over time. SOEs reached their peaks at the end of ‘70s, when they 
accounted for around 7% of GDP in developed countries, 12% in developing non-socialist 
countries, and around 90% in planned economies (Bernier, 2014; Musacchio and Lazzarini, 
2014).  
Despite the wave of privatization that occurred afterwards, they still have a 
considerable impact. SOEs account for a large share of market capitalization, investment and 
employment (Clò et al., 2016). Their role has been and still is particularly relevant in key 
industries as utilities and infrastructures, although open competition has replaced natural 
monopolies in several countries. Not surprisingly, SOEs have been a key issue in the debate 
among scholars, on one hand, and among practitioners and politicians, on the other. The 
debate was strictly interwoven until the beginning of the ’90, when the collapse of walls 
between Western and Easter Europe cut SOEs off the political agenda. Still, several scholars, 
practitioners and politicians argue that have been and still are relevant, especially with regard 
to emerging countries like China, whereas others maintain that should progressively leave the 
scene to private companies. 
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In this paper, we explore the function of SOEs in technology development and 
innovation activities. Our thesis is that SOEs have been playing, and still do play, a complex 
role. In a sentence, SOEs are knowledge explorer agents for a State acting as a knowledge 
recombinator. The argument is that SOEs often go beyond their specific value chains, search 
and access new technologies, acquire technical capabilities, and implement innovation in 
products and processes precisely because their assignment is to a large extent wide and their 
mission challenging. This requires a high degree of autonomy, considerable resources, and a 
general setting that makes possible for SOEs to do their job. SOEs are exploring agents 
launched in an unknown space but equipped with good parachutes. They are entitled to 
explore in different directions, possibly working with other public and private organizations. 
Some linkages and interdependencies with other organizations may be designed in advance. 
Others may emerge over time. SOEs are, therefore, decision-makers that do not depend on 
the State’s say on which direction to take. SOEs explore paths that seem to lead nowhere, and 
that turn out to be fundamental for innovation. On the same token, SOEs investigate routes 
that, at the beginning, seem relevant and then become unsuccessful. SOEs select alternatives, 
shedding lights on dark areas where private companies cannot enter. SOEs reject 
technological alternatives that lead nowhere, sort knowledge that looks promising, and makes 
it available to others. This way, knowledge gets recombined without relying on a top-down, 
planned approach.  
To back-up our position, we rely on the case of two industries: aerospace and 
semiconductor. Two French-Italian companies, namely STMicroelectronics in the 
semiconductor industry and Thales Alenia Space in space technologies, emerged from a long 
and complex process. They both explored new, on the edge technologies. They both 
combined different internal and external capabilities and were able to cope with severe 
environmental jolts.  They both succeeded in modifying their ownership structures through a 
5 
 
wave of mergers and acquisitionsthat allowed them to emerge. They started from narrow, 
specific domains and were able to reach a relevant position in new technologies and new 
industries. Both companies show two peculiar features: a superior exploratory capability, that 
allowed them to  investigate new frontiers, and a combinatorial capability, that made the 
combination of different structures and practices possible. STMicroelectronics and Thales 
Alenia Space are a good example of the role SOEs can play. 
The main implication of our paper is that the contribution of SOEs to innovation 
processes is largely underestimated. In the so-called debate on the ‘entrepreneurial State’ 
SOEs are barely considered. Supporters of the ‘entrepreneurial State’ argue that the state 
guides the ‘technoeconomic process’ (Mazzucato, 2014, 8). According to this view, most of 
the radical innovations that ‘have fuelled the dynamics of capitalism—from railroads to the 
Internet, to modern-day nanotechnology and pharmaceuticals—depend upon capital-
intensive, ‘entrepreneurial’ investments pioneered by the State’ (Mazzucato 2013, 3). On the 
other hand, critics dispute the role of the State, arguing that it is detrimental to innovation and 
progress. According to this perspective, the State picks winners instead of promoting free 
competition. Therefore, market incentives get reduced and the overall economic performance 
decreases (McClosky, 2010). This way, the State impairs the dynamic nature of the market 
that provides fertile ground to entrepreneurial action and innovation (Kirzner, 2000). 
We argue that SOEs‘ are an important vehicle for innovation. They also support the 
view of the State as a knowledge recombinator through decentralized structures ‘in which the 
organizations involved are nimble, innovative and dynamic’ (Breznitz and Ornston, 2013). 
We acknowledge the role of the State, but we argue that SOEs are  specific mechanisms that 
deserve in-depth investigation. SOEs are a special vehicle used to explore new possible 
recombinations of knowledge. 
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Our paper has several limits. First, is that it is largely based on two case-studies. 
Although they cover two relevant industries in Italy and France, they mainly provide 
anecdotal evidence. A longitudinal, in-depth analysis could offer a better understanding of the 
role played by SOEs in these two industries. Second, we have scattered evidence about the 
effects both companies have produced at a system level, as we had limited access to data and 
information. Third, we could not do a micro investigation to assess which specific 
components of the two companies were crucial in their development. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we review the 
relevant literature of SOEs and discuss how they operate in innovation activities. In the third 
section, we present the case of the aerospace and semiconductor industries. Finally, we draw 
main conclusions and offer possible insights and suggestions for future research. 
 
2. Literature review  
 
2.1 State Owned enterprises 
Both in centrally planned and market economies, SOEs represent a key element of the 
economic and social landscape. OECD (2015: p. 14) defines State Owned enterprises as ‘any 
corporate entity recognised by national law as an enterprise, and in which the state exercises 
ownership’. Musacchio and Lazzarini (2014) distinguish three different models: the 
Leviathan as entrepreneur, where the State has full control; the Leviathan as major investor, 
where private shareholders have a minority share; and the Leviathan as a minority investor, 
that regulates the dominant operators through ad hoc directives. 
Liberalization and political pressures decreased the number of SOEs in developed 
economies since the 1980s (Guriev and Megginson, 2007). Nevertheless, SOEs are still 
relevant nowadays for the world economy. Before the 2008 crisis, SOEs produced between 
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one fourth and one fifth of industrial output and accounted for a large part of the total assets 
in advanced economies (OECD, 2005; Tõnurist and Karo, 2016). After the crisis, their 
presence and economic weight have increased. For instance, the share of SOEs among the 
Fortune Global 500 has increased from 9% in 2005 to 23% in 2014 (PWC, 2015), despite the 
fact that listed SOEs are just a limited subset of the total (OECD, 2014). Today, SOEs 
account for around 10% of global GDP and represent around 20% of global market 
capitalization (Bruton et al., 2015).  
SOEs are particularly relevant in new developing countries (Ralston et al., 2006; 
Musacchio and Lazzarini, 2014; Stan, Peng, and Bruton, 2014). Most of the SOEs in the 
world are Chinese. They produce 29% of China’s GDP (Lee, 2009), control the national 
economy, and are dominant in the strategic industries (Chan and Rosenbloom 2010; Nolan 
and Xiaoqiang, 1999; Girma et al., 2009). Besides China, SOEs are highly significant in 
transitional economies like Brazil (Trebat 1983, Musacchio and Lazzarini 2014), India 
(Baliga and  Santalainen, 2006), and Russia  (Gershman et al., 2016). 
SOEs are also largely present in high developed countries like Finland, Sweden 
(Clifton et al., 2006; Tõnurist and Karo, 2016), France (Levy, 1999) and Italy.  In Italy, SOEs 
were the main instrument to nurture economic development and to support economic growth  
(Antonelli et al., 2014; Clò et al., 2016) A pivotal element of the SOE model in Italy was IRI 
(Amatori and Toninelli, 2011), a public holding established in 1933 and dismantled in 2002. 
IRI invested heavily in steel and in the transport, machinery, and electrical equipment 
industries (Toninelli and Vasta, 2011). However, the industrial specialization of IRI went far 
beyond the supply of capital goods, particularly in the form of intermediary inputs. Instead, 
IRI had a central role in the technological advancement of multiple industries, including ICT, 
power generation, aerospace, and electronics (Antonelli et al., 2014).  
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Scholars agree in considering SOEs a specific stream of research (Peng et al., 2016). 
Broadly speaking, the debate around SOEs has mainly focussed on two issues.  First, and 
most common issue concerns reasons that drive States’ attitude to guide economic 
development by designing and implementing general and industrial policies. In this 
framework, SOEs exist to achieve a mix of economic and social interests’ goals. Three 
specific reasons explain why SOEs exist. First, is the case in which the market mechanism 
fails to achieve an efficient allocation of resources because of market failure (Arrow, 1969). 
When market failures occur, SOEs can support governments in producing positive 
externalities, usually in public goods. Typically, SOEs deal with utilities and network 
industries like energy and telecommunications. Utilities are frequently characterized by 
monopolistic or highly concentrated markets, large-scale operations, and huge investments.  
Second, SOEs make social objectives possible when economic incentives do not exist. SOEs 
can make basic services available to the whole population even through economic incentives 
do not exist or are negative, as in the case of wired telephone connections. Third, SOEs are 
crucial in supporting the development of particular areas or specific industries. This was the 
case for instance, of Southern Italy, where SOEs have heavily invested in the hope of igniting 
autonomous growth (Christiansen, 2011; Del Bo and Florio, 2012; Tõnurist and Karo, 2016). 
A combination of economic and social goals would characterize SOEs as organizations that 
pursue stability in lieu of change (Mintzberg, 1979) in the interest of the general public 
(OECD, 2015, 19). 
Second, a more recent issue deals with the performance of SOEs vis-a-vis private 
companies.  The general assumption is that SOEs would be ceteris paribus, less efficient than 
private companies in allocating resources for two reasons. First and foremost, SOEs often 
enjoy a monopoly status and are not designed to face competitive conditions, especially when 
new, disruptive business models emerge. This is, for instance, the case of the airline industry 
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in Europe, where national champions–once enjoying monopolistic status and recording huge 
profits–have experienced severe problems and often exited the industry once competitive 
conditions emerged through liberalization (Williams, 1994). Second, SOEs are normally 
designed to simultaneously achieve social and economic goals. Although in principle social 
and economic goals are not necessarily in conflict, managers would be constrained in their 
capacity to extract value from current operations as they must comply with political 
guidelines. Managers of SOEs would lack incentives to pursue efficiency (Ramamurti, 2000; 
Freund, 2001) due to administrative and political reasons (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; 
Shleifer, 1998; Ramaswamy, 2001). However, despite SOEs being associated with scant 
economic efficiency, there is actually no full support of the hypothesis that firms’ 
performance depends upon their ownership control–be it private, public, or privatized 
(Boardman and Vining, 1989; Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001). More recently, however, 
scholars found management culture, legislation, political goals, and competition to negatively 
impact SOEs efficiency much more than state ownership (Victor et al., 2011; Belloc, 2014). 
Reasons why SOEs exist and performance issues are still central in the political and 
research agenda, but other–less clear-cut, evident but, perhaps, more fruitful matters have 
emerged recently. First, is the comparative political economic perspective of SOEs, as 
suggested by Millward (2011), who explores at large the relationship between States and 
companies (including SOEs). He found that for a long period, public policies in Western 
Europe aimed at ensuring national cohesion and external protection, more than economic 
growth and welfare. Second, is the government-firms interaction. The hypothesis is that the 
effectiveness of specific policies (e.g. those supporting the creation of global players) 
depends upon appropriate co-ordination mechanisms and proper incentives (Colli, Mariotti 
and Piscitello, 2014). Governments act not only as a rule-setter but also as a strategist with 
long-term goals. The key element is the alignment of interests between states and companies 
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with the emergence of coalitions that are relatively stable over time. These coalitions would 
make policies effective. Third, has to do with the role played by the State in innovation 
processes as discussed below. 
 
2.2 SOEs and innovation 
Since Arrow’s seminal contribution, there are good theoretical reasons to 
acknowledge that to a considerable extent research and invention ought to be financed by 
governments or  ‘some other agency not governed by profit-and-loss-criteria’ (Arrow, 1962, 
623). It is no surprise that ‘this has always happened to a certain extent’ thanks to efforts 
made by research centres, universities, and individuals. The role played by the government 
goes beyond basic research and covers several stages of the innovation process. For example, 
the state supports entrepreneurs in the U.S.  through the Small Business Administration 
(SBA); it encourages start-ups through incubators publicly funded, as in Israel; it directly 
invests in innovative companies through specific funds, as in the case of Finland (Mazzucato, 
2016); and so on. 
That States and governments are key actors in the innovation process should be 
indisputable, not only for their investments and for the resources they allocate, but also 
because they are often involved in adopting new technologies and processes (OECD, 2015). 
Although the available evidence is mostly anecdotal, there is the proof that breakthrough 
innovation can also occur in the public sector (Sahni et al., 2013). Paradoxically, successful 
innovations in the public sectors often occur in the presence of financial constraints and 
budget cuts, suggesting that the public sector is a major source of innovation and a possible 
catalyst for new solutions.  
Literature on the role played by governments in innovation processes is extensive, but 
this is not the case of the role specifically played by SOEs. Empirical research on the link 
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between SOEs and innovation is scant and mostly centred around the role played by 
government-linked companies in newly developed countries. At a more micro level, scholars 
have investigated specific issues like knowledge spillovers from SOEs’ activity (Molas-
Galart and Tang, 2006, Munari et al., 2010, Musacchio and Staykov, 2011), inquired about 
the roadmapping abilities of SOEs to implement technological forecasting (Gershman et al., 
2016; Vishnevskiy et al., 2015), and explored their absorptive capacity (Li, 2011). 
Recent literature has re-evaluated the role played by SOEs, suggesting that their 
impact is much more relevant than previously assessed. According to this view, SOEs are a 
powerful mechanism of knowledge governance (Antonelli et al., 2014). The assumption is 
that knowledge spillovers are not all alike, and that necessary, complementary conditions 
must be in place to leverage their full potential. More specifically, knowledge spillovers’ 
effects depend upon the characteristics of the source, the perspective user and the context in 
which knowledge spillovers occur (Antonelli et al., 2014). In the second wave of Italian 
industrialization that occurred in the second part of the 20th century, SOEs would have been 
excellent sources of knowledge spillovers, therefore playing a central role in generating and 
spreading new knowledge. More precisely, SOEs ‘were able to feed the fast rates of total 
factor productivity (TFP) growth of the system with the provision of strong and far reaching 
spillovers carrying high quality knowledge externalities’ (Antonelli et al., 2014, 44). Several 
factors explain the overall contribution of SOEs in producing and spreading new knowledge. 
First and foremost, SOEs are characterized by an institutional mix of property rights (shares 
controlled by IRI, a public holding company, but traded on the Stock Exchange), where 
public property paralleled the style of private entrepreneurship. Second, SOEs were given 
high managerial autonomy and long-term R&D projects were encouraged; this way, a 
national research system with labs in different domains was established, favouring the 
dissemination of high quality knowledge. Third, and more important, SOEs acted in Italy as 
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an open R&D system, performing in-house research commissioned from outside and 
commissioning projects performed externally. They operated as the interface between 
scientific research, through hundreds of projects with external structures, and the generation 
of new technological knowledge, that was accomplished through licenses, technology 
agreements, and joint-ventures with foreign multinationals. In the Italian case, SOEs were a 
powerful instrument of innovation policy, not only because they accounted for a large share 
of investments in R&D, but because they were central in producing and spreading new 
knowledge to the industrial system. 
Other scholars highlight the role of SOEs as instruments of innovation policy, 
suggesting that the analysis at firm level ought to be accompanied with a macro level 
governance perspective. Tõnurist and Karo (2016) argue that SOEs provide an institutional 
setting where private incentives and risk taking behaviour, on one side, and public incentives 
and long-term orientation, on the other side, cohabit.  Their double-faced nature and the 
ability to combine into a single organization a public and private role would make SOEs good 
candidates not only for producing and disseminating new knowledge, but also for 
coordinating and directing other actors that are needed for nurturing a national innovation 
system. This way, SOEs are conceived both as independent innovators, they pursue specific 
long-term innovation strategies in a specific domain, and as a policy instrument within a 
larger policy mix that can vary according to broader factors. 
The rationale of SOEs in innovation activities is justified by more immediate 
feedbacks they can transfer to innovation policy makers as well as their risk-
taking/experimentation capabilities (Tõnurist and Karo, 2016), within a framework that 
emphasises the co-evolution of micro-level managerial capabilities and macro-level policy 
capacities.  
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We argue that this co-evolution plays a key role in affecting the development of a 
national innovation system. This co-evolution, however, needs to be explored and examined 
in depth, as it requires an evaluation of several factors. First, coordination mechanisms put in 
place between SOEs and government/State agencies can have a relevant impact on innovation 
processes (Colli, Mariotti and Piscitello, 2016). Effective coordination mechanisms can 
facilitate transmission of information from companies to policy makers. They can also 
produce faster, more appropriate decisions at both levels. Second, alignment of several 
actors–as managers of SOEs, institutional committees and government–is crucial. Alignment 
emerges over time, producing stable coalitions. Alignment is not a static equilibrium, as it 
encompasses possible disagreements among key actors, who might have different preferences 
about critical issues. However, this alignment occurs thanks to a common vision and shared 
values.  
The role played by SOEs in innovation processes depends upon two interdependent 
variables: decisions made at the company’s level and policy guidelines set at the central level 
by a dominant coalition. If the dominant coalition is stable for an appropriate time and actors 
are aligned, SOEs can be successful in promoting and sustaining innovation processes thanks 
to their combinatorial capability. Combinatorial capability is the outcome of two different, 
intertwined, activities.  
The first activity is the acquisition of knowledge. Acquisition of knowledge is 
essentially a process of search, screening, and recognition of existing pieces of knowledge, 
both from internal sources, either tacit or formal, and external knowledge by interaction with 
users and owners (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Metcalfe, 2007; Arthur, 2009). 
Acquisition of knowledge in the case of SOEs has occurred to a large extent through both 
internal and external sources, as in the case of IRI (Antonelli et al., 2014). Managers of IRI 
operative companies enjoyed a significant degree of autonomy. Autonomy and managerial 
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skills made a broad search for new knowledge possible both from internal and external 
sources. These features supported the exchange of both codified and tacit knowledge from 
technological domains that in principle, were quite distant from each other.  Such an 
exchange requires absorptive capacity and learning abilities (Nooteboom, 2000; Gilsing et al., 
2008) between SOEs and private companies  
The second activity is the recombination of knowledge. Recombination of knowledge, 
occurs when an organization has access to the internal and external knowledge repository of 
other organizations and is able to interact with them on a continuous basis.  This 
recombination depends upon the quality and variety of knowledge sources (Graf and Krüger, 
2011; Arikan and Knoben 2014). 
The cquisition and recombination of knowledge is possible to the extent organizations 
are entitled to explore unfamiliar and possibly unknown domains. At the same time, 
permission to explore does not necessarily mean to be able to discover new valuable 
knowledge and to extract value from it. In the next section, we report the case studies of two 
SOEs that succeeded in exploring and discovering new knowledge, thus complying with the 
call for  ‘more detailed case studies of the few success stories of SOEs as innovation 
entrepreneurs’ (Tõnurist and Karo, 2016, 641).  
 
3. SOEs as knowledge explorer agents 
 
3.1 Methods and case selection 
Our analysis focuses on two different industries across two countries. We have chosen 
France and Italy because SOEs have always played a key role. We have triangulated 
anecdotal information, first-hand data, and secondary data to retrieve the formation and the 
evolution of Thales Alenia Spazio in the aerospace industry and STMicroelectronics in the 
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semiconductor industry. In their present state, both companies are the outcome of several 
mergers and acquisition processes that occurred at various stages. STMicroelectronics and 
Thales Alenia Space are illustrative of exploration processes undertaken in different high-
tech industries and of a recombinant capability that allowed they to emerge as leading 
companies. 
  
3.2 STMicroelectronics 
STMicroelectronics (or ST) is nowadays a French-Italian multinational company 
based in Genève and the leading European firm in the semiconductor industry. 
STMicroelectronics is the world’s sixth semiconductor producer in terms of earnings, with 
revenues of 6.2 billion € in 2015. It employs around 44.000 people, of which around 11.500 
are in 16 R&D centres around the globe, from Milan and Catania in Italy, to Grenoble and 
Rousset in France, and others around the world including Singapore (STMicroelectronics 
corporate website), and owns more than 16 thousands patents (Cinici, 2013). 
ST was formed in 1987 after the merge of French Thomson’s semiconductor branch 
and Italian SGS (Società Italiana Semiconduttori). The decision of the merger resulted in a 
commercial success and was one of the most remarkable in the industry and in Europe 
(Coriat and Lucchini, 1995). More relevant, the company still is largely state-owned. The 
company has been the leading global supplier of analog circuits for telecommunications and 
the second largest for SRAM memories since 1992. At the time of the merger, the company’s 
main shareholders were the French and Italian governments with 45% each. The key players 
in the ownership structure were respectively France Telecomm and Thomson on the French 
side, and IRI on the Italian side. It became partially public in 1994, with an initial public 
offering on the Paris and New York stock exchanges, and then in 1998, in Milan. The capital 
injection was useful for acquisitions, including the semiconductor divisions of Nortel in 
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Canada, Alcatel in France, and Genesis Microchip in the US. In the meantime, the original 
name SGS-Thomson changed to STMicroelectronics in 1997. In 2002, ST reached an alliance 
with Motorola, Philips, and Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company. In 2007, it 
created a joint venture with Intel in memory applications. By that time, ST was the first 
producer in Europe and the sixth in the world. Today, around 27.5% of its shares are equally 
controlled by French and Italian public bodies, i.e. Cassa Depositi e Prestiti and Bpifrance 
Banque Publique d'Investissement (STMicroelectronics, 2016, 73). 
The older firm of the STMicroelectronics merger is SGS Microelettronica, which was 
the result of a merger, too. SGS, originally founded by Adriano Olivetti in 1957, and vacuum 
tube maker ATES (Aquila Tubi e Semiconduttori), a State Owned enterprise, merged in 
1972. The second firm, Thomson Semiconducteurs, combined, in 1982, the State Owned 
Thomson’s electronic division, evolved from the Compagnie Generale de Telegraphie San 
Fils, with a handful of small electronic firms, and a few years later, with US  integrated 
circuit manufacturer Mostek. SGS-Thomson formed to overcome the limits of small markets 
in France and Italy and to contrast the power of American, i.e. Intel and Motorola, and 
Japanese, i.e. NEC, semiconductor producers.   
The two original companies were already a combination of spare technological 
capabilities, from telecommunications to electronics. The later merger further expanded the 
technological boundaries of the firm and overcame national borders. The challenge was in the 
control of existing resources and capabilities and the accumulation of new knowledge in a 
context of uncertain dominant design (Cabanes et al. 2016). However, keeping control over 
internal knowledge is not sufficient to sustain innovation. Large firms often expand beyond 
their own assets and capacities in search of complementary resources to reach full innovative 
capacity (Teece, 1986; Christensen, 2006). STMicroelectronics was successful in the 
application of a ‘comprehensive up-front strategy’ involving combinations, alliances, and 
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acquisitions in an open-innovation fashion (Christensen et al 2005, 1546); for examples, ST 
engaged with Apogee–an American specialist in amplifier technology–to form a partnership 
aiming at ‘an interactive and evolving learning process based on a mutual recognition of the 
opportunities for innovative synergies between the two parties’ (Christensen, 2006). An 
empirical analysis of 52 R&D projects conducted in an ST subsidiary over the period 1998-
2003, shows a large use of co-operative partnership agreements either with universities (19), 
research centres (11), or firms (22), while the contracting of single activity is much higher 
with universities (21) than with other firms (4), leaving to research centres the supply of 
special services (Cassiman, Di Guardo, Valentini, 2009). The competitive advantage of ST is 
in discovering, accessing, mobilizing, and leveraging knowledge from a global network of 
localized sources (Doz, Santos, Williamson, 2001). The control of different sources of 
knowledge diversity, i.e. alliances, is then strategically important. In this respect, the 
autonomy granted to the management has been essential. The experience of Pasquale Pistorio 
as Ceo of ST between 1987 and 2005 is illustrative. He managed ST looking at both the 
interest of the State-ownership, and of the overall stakeholders, for example, by being one of 
the first companies to invest seriously in sustainability. However, his major contribution was 
in the organization of a worldwide company. He was able to manage an internal network of 
geographically dislocated ‘micro’ units, each with a distinct culture, devoted to targets 
coherent with the overall corporate vision (Pistorio, 2011, 207-208). 
The ability to generate the power of diversity into a steam of innovation is at the base 
of ST’s governance. Serendipity and coordination of knowledge boosted the enterprise’s 
innovation (Santos, Doz, Williamson, 2004). Nevertheless, the organization of capabilities 
and knowledge diversity is a determinant for the adoption of the proper governance form. 
Governance of alliances through co-operative agreements seems insufficient to assure control 
compared to contracts (Cassiman et al., 2009). Conversely, however, an equity-based alliance 
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that spans across different activities is more suitable to transfer tacit knowledge and allows 
greater exchange and value creation than contracting for knowledge transfer performance 
(Chen, 2004). 
The STMicroelectronics case highlights new innovation management issues. Scholars 
examined the innovative process in the ST case to present a balance of co-operative and 
competitive forces in R&D projects based on knowledge attributes, governance structure, and 
partner selection (Cassiman et al., 2009). ST shows an organizational evolution to deal with 
new and existing knowledge, internal and external expertise, and new instruments to organize 
and coordinate knowledge sources and the relative learning processes (Bigliardi, Galati, 
Petroni, 2011; Cabanas et al, 2016). The firm combined a strategy of specialization with 
organizational changes, ‘aiming at taking advantage from the most up-to-date experiences 
about present sources and criteria of innovation and competitivity’ (Coriat and Lucchini, 
1995, 151).  
The key to ST’s success is its organization of knowledge for competences integration 
and its role as a hub of collaborations, co-operations, and partnership in the industry. In fact, 
organizing for competences integration goes beyond particular areas of technological 
knowledge; instead, it includes screening and acquisition of knowledge (Kogut and Zander, 
1992). STMicroelectronics oriented its strategy around a strong external network. Within this 
network, ST has the role of system integrator, innovation architect, and knowledge 
coordinator of increasingly distributed and vertically disintegrated competences 
(Christiensen, 2006). Then, STMicroelectronics built a strategy of alliances to pool and 
combine complementary technologies. Strategic alliances allowed overcoming industrial 
boundaries. Around half of ST’s sales comes from partnerships with 12 actors in four key 
industries: automotive, computer hardware, electronics goods, and telecommunications 
(Steve, 2004). 
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ST’s network of collaboration goes beyond industrial partnerships. For example, in 
Italy it signed agreements with University of Catania and Sant’Anna School of Advanced 
Studies in Pisa (SSSUP). In Catania, the partnership with the local university aimed to 
educate personnel for its facility in Sicily (Cassar, 2002). The partnership with Sant’Anna 
looks at common research in bio-robotics, smart systems, and microelectronics (SSSUP, 
2011). 
 
Figure 1: HERE 
 
 
3.3 Thales Alenia Space 
20 years ago (in 1997) the mission Cassini-Huygens started its journey to the planet 
Saturn. The orbiter Cassini concluded its exploration of Saturn in April 2017, and it is 
currently expected to dive into the planet and be destroyed in its atmosphere. The probe 
Huygens landed on Saturn’s moon Titan in January 2005, and since then has been sending 
data back to Earth including 350 pictures of the moon’s surface. The mission took over 25 
years and is now close to conclusion. It has been one of the major space scientific programs 
in decades. Many countries are participating in the mission, with a greater effort from the 
space agencies of the USA (NASA), Europe (ESA), and Italy (ASI). Enterprises from France 
and Italy have been particularly involved in the development of the spacecraft. French 
Aérospatiale was the prime contractor for assembling the probe and the scientific equipment, 
while the Italian Space Agency was in charge of the radio antenna, the Visible and Infrared 
Mapping Spectrometer (VIMS), and the radio-science subsystem for Cassini (Asi, Cassini-
Huygens, 2017), for which Italian State-holding Finmeccanica was the main supplier. 
Nowadays, the companies originally involved in the project development of the mission 
merged in a leading European space company, Thales Alenia Space.  
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Thales Alenia Space formed in 2005 as a joint-venture between French 
telecommunication company Alcatel-Lucent and Italian aerospace and electronics company 
Leonardo (formerly Finmeccanica). The original name of the company was Alcatel Alenia 
Space before rebranding to the present name in 2006, following the acquisition of Alcatel’s 
space activities by the French defence group Thales. The joint-venture is not equal; Thales 
owns 67% of the share, while Leonardo owns the remaining 33%. Both companies are State 
controlled. The French government is the first shareholder of Thales with around 25% of total 
shares (Thales, 2015); similarly, the Italian Ministry of Economy holds around 30% of 
Leonardo.  
Theles Alenia Space operates in several business lines. It is among the world leaders 
in the design and production of satellites and payloads for telecommunications and 
navigation, and is the world leader in radar altimeters for operational space oceanography. It 
also operates in Earth observation, scientific exploration of space, and produces Orbital 
infrastructure and space transport. Thales Alenia Space is one of the major contractors of the 
International Space Station (ISS), having delivered over half of its pressurized volume. It 
posted revenues of 2.4 billion euros in 2016 and  around 8.000 employees (Thales company 
website). 
Today’s company is a combination of technologies inherited from enterprises hardly 
related to space. It took a long way to reach full and systemic capabilities in space 
technologies. The origins can be traced into distant and yet complementary businesses. What 
is peculiar in this case is that, despite both companies and states pursuing a long-term 
strategy, there was not a clear understanding of space technologies as the ultimate goal of that 
strategy at its inception. The effort was instead in the continuous attempt to keep pace with 
the technological frontier that, at the time–in the second half of the 20th Century–was a 
matter of ‘race’ between superpowers. France traditionally pushes State Owned companies to 
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protect the independence of the nation from foreign technologies, even at the cost of 
inefficient techno-nationalism. Such fetishism toward national technological capacity 
explains the position of France in up-front technologies such as nuclear power, but even more 
unproductive efforts in industries like information-technologies (Nohara and Verdier, 2001). 
On the contrary, Italian enterprises were able to take part in many innovative industries, from 
nuclear power to informatics, yet a lack of government strategy, and especially of industrial 
policies, has cost the country’s companies exit from many promising businesses. To see an 
Italian company in the space business today might seem a paradox. Instead, it is the result of 
an open-strategy to sustain not a particular business or picking a singular company, but rather 
to let technological competences cumulate in State Owned enterprises and recombine among 
them and/or with others, whether private or foreign.  
The company had–at its creation–a large experience in several lines of business, from 
electronics to aeronautics, which turn out to be instrumental to the design, assembly, and 
operation of integrated space system (Tornincasa et al., 2008).  On the French side, Alcatel 
Space merged the space activities of the mother company Alcatel–a world leader in 
telecommunications and network equipment founded in 1876–with the satellite’s business of 
aerospace company Aérospatiale in 1998. Then, Alcatel Space reached a cooperation 
agreement with Thompson-CSF, an electronic company predecessor of Thales group. Both 
Aérosaptiale and Thomson-CSF were State Owned companies. Just a few years later, in 
2001, Alcatel bought Thales’ stake for €795 million (Thales, 2016,: 177). The Space division 
of Alcatel was transferred again to Thales in 2006, which assumed the actual name Thales 
Alenia Space. Thales followed the partial privatization of Thomson in 1998 and today 
operates mainly in the three areas of aerospace, defence, and electronics. It is a world leader 
in traveling wave tube technology, fundamental to telecommunications satellites. 
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On the Italian side, Finmeccanica–recently rebranded as Leonardo–was the holding 
company for the mechanical industries of the State Owned IRI group. Finmeccanica have 
operated in several industries since 1948, including automotive through Alfa Romeo; energy, 
transportation, and engineering through Ansaldo; and Aerospace through Aerospazio. 
Finmeccanica organized its business around aerospace and defence during the 1980s with the 
sale of Alfa Romeo and the acquisition of the electronic company Selenia, itself owned by 
IRI. Finmeccanica merged the space subsidiary of Selenia in Aeritalia in 1990, which later 
became Alenia. The merger consolidated a wide range of technological capabilities. Indeed, 
Aeritalia was the pursuance of IRI’s aeronautic business Aerfer integrated in 1969 with 
private Fiat-Aviazione, a firm created to consolidate the national capabilities in the industry. 
On the other hand, Selenia started in Naples in 1961 as a partnership between Italian Edison 
and Finmeccanica with American Raytheon. Selenia was built around the competences in 
radar production and the operator of three small companies aggregated by IRI as part of 
Finmeccanica, which then attributed their capabilities to the partnership (Zamagni, 2009). It 
became alongside Aeritalia the main contractor of the Italian space program and among the 
firsts in the European Space Agency (Landoni, 2016). The consequences are two. First, 
Selenia spun off its space activities in 1982 with the formation of Selenia Spazio, Second, IRI 
arranged a further consolidation of the industry, this time aiming exactly at the space 
technologies, through the merge of Aeritalia and Selenia in 1990. Alenia Spazio operated in 
the satellite production and operations and in the space infrastructure manufacturing 
businesses, and was in active partner in many international partnerships, including the 
International Space Station. 
 
Figure 2: HERE 
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4. Discussion 
 
The two cases shed light on a pattern of technological (and industrial) evolution based 
on the active role of SOEs in exploring and organizing knowledge sources. Relevant to our 
discussion is that, despite the sources of knowledge being distant and apparently non 
matchable, their combination led to the emergence of new technologies and a novel industry 
(i.e. space) as result of an SOE assisted process of knowledge exploration. Because this SOEs 
provided the means of creation of the new technology. 
SOEs in our case studies do not repeat the ‘national champion’ model, based on the 
three issues that deal with the government-business relation. First, they operate as 
multinationals in competitive markets without national protectionism. Second, although the 
companies are no longer ‘national champions’ in a strict sense, both the French and Italian 
states own relevant stakes, so that SOEs remain strategically connected to governments. 
Third, it follows that State-ownership is not detrimental to integration with foreign 
companies, and conversely one can speculate about possible advantages because of the 
limited case of comparable success of private multinationals in high-technologies in both 
countries. 
Both our cases overcame national protectionism by merging with foreign firms. 
Economies of scale and industrial dynamics are surely mainsprings of internationalization; 
yet, the role of the SOE is still not neglected. Indeed, SOEs have been government-backed for 
years in the two countries, but our cases show greater liberty to evolve autonomously. Such 
evolution happened not just because the state picked a direction, but for the conditions it 
provided, a decentralized structure effective at learning and innovation, coordinated with 
policy expertise and intelligence, which resulted in SOEs as organizations that embrace the 
private autonomy of management and public mission. The first allows exploring and learning 
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with an entrepreneurial attitude, the second to avoid top-down decision and still assuring 
long-term commitment and strategic coordination with governments (Mazzucato, 2016).  
STMicroelectronics is an example of an organization free to explore industrial 
solutions beyond its firm and national boundaries centred on a public mission of nurturing a 
semiconductor industry in Europe. Semiconductor technologies have been at the core of the 
development of ST since its origin. Since the general purpose of this technology allows for its 
application in multiple fields, from telecommunication to computers, different competences 
are required. The Italian side of the company was formed by the merger of computer 
manufacturer Olivetti’s subsidiary with a vacuum tube producer. Around the same time, the 
French side resulted from the aggregation of electronic and telecommunication competences 
of various French companies, e.g. Compagnie Generale de Telegraphie San Fils, with the 
State Owned Thomson; yet the spectrum of capabilities was not enough to fulfil the 
production of advanced components like semiconductors. Thus, Thomson Semiconducteurs 
explored the most developed market for the industry, the US market, in search of the missing 
specialist capability. Eventually, Thomson acquired the chip maker Mostek from United 
Technologies in 1985 (von Tunzelmann, 1999, 144). Due to distance between a large French 
company and a small US firm caused the integration of Mostek in Thomson was not fully 
successful (Doz, 1987), it is still relevant for two reasons. First, it shows the will of a State 
Owned enterprise to look beyond its familiar domain and its effort to explore a technology-
seeking acquisition; this provides more evidence from the increasing studies on the 
international merger and acquisition (M&A) activities of SOEs other than Chinese (Chen and 
Young, 2010). Second, it confirms how SOEs are important to innovation through the 
acquisition of foreign technology (Li, 2011). 
ST overcame the cultural distance when the management was able to benefit from 
great autonomy, as stated by Pasquale Pistorio, first Ceo of ST (Pistorio, 201). Whether the 
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acquisition of US Mostek was not successful due to the cultural differences with a French 
SOE, ST later based its growth on a globalized network of research centres. The management 
of diversity is essential to innovative companies, the real key in explaining success and 
failure. On one hand, the independence of activities has been a boost for innovation; on the 
other hand, management has leveraged diversity as part of its corporate strategy, not 
subjugated to political-oriented, short-term goals, e.g. electoral support. 
The activity of exploration of distant knowledge sources is even more evident in the 
case of Thales Alenia Space. First of all, space technologies simply did not exist in their 
present definition. Then, the few aerospace capabilities available were an insufficient base to 
start the space industry both in Italy and France. The industry emerged from a novel 
combination of aerospace, electronics, and telecommunications technologies. In France, 
Alcatel and Aérospatiale were respectively SOEs in the telecommunication and aerospace 
industries. They later merged in Alcatel-Space. Similarly in Italy, Aeritalia and Selenia were 
SOEs in aerospace and electronics. The latter enjoyed the collaboration with US based 
Raytheon for developing its radar activity. The two Italian SOEs formed Alenia in 1990.  
The assembly of technological capabilities took several stages. Around 1990 two 
SOEs, Alcatel-Space in France and Alenia Spazio in Italy, were operating in the space 
industry. Market dimension and particularly the search for a greater synergy of activities 
prompted a further merger. Again, as in the case of ST, State ownership did not prevent the 
exploration of technological complementarities neither in foreigner nor different industries. 
Furthermore, the governance structure changed to adapt to the expansion toward international 
markets.  
The two cases together highlight the ability of SOEs to explore and combine new 
knowledge despite differences in industry, market, and national identity. The process of 
technological combination has proved to be effective in the case of ST, which compete in a 
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global market of components for consumer electronics goods, as well as Thales Alenia Space, 
which conversely depends on demand strongly oriented to public buyers due to the minimum 
scale needed and the national interest linked to a defence-oriented industry. Both ST and 
Thales Alenia Space are expanding beyond their main area of activities. For example, ST has 
also been producing since the 90s SRAM memories and other memory devices in 
collaboration with Intel other than semiconductors, and it is collaborating with other 
industries, e.g. automotive. They were and are able to keep innovating on the basis of a firm’s 
governance that continuously adapts the boundaries of the frim. Our observations show how 
ST and Thales Alenia Space growth has been based on the internal organization of externally 
acquired capabilities (Cassiman et al., 2009). This growth occurred through numerous 
acquisitions. As a result, the two companies are now leaders in Europe in their innovative 
domain and among the world leaders. Significantly, acquisitions did not follow a simple 
vertical integration strategy, but instead used a network that goes beyond their specific value 
chain both horizontally and vertically to access new technologies.  
In this regard, the need for collecting and combining capabilities explains the choice 
of governance and organization (Argyres et al., 2012). Heterogeneity of capabilities is found 
in and across industries; however the need to capitalize on their recombination gives rise to a 
centralized governance mode. The centrality of the SOE model works as a hub that produces 
a vision shared between management and government, leaving autonomy to corporate 
management in the organization of the sources of knowledge. Such an organizational form 
appears extremely relevant. It allows changing the boundaries of the firm continuously over 
time; it has been able to overcome and learn from setbacks as happened in the Thomson case; 
it kept the dynamic process of exploration and acquisition of capabilities active and efficient 
in the long run. Indeed, these two cases show companies continuously dealing with protean 
redefinition of their industry, mainly due to multiple M&As. This ability to redefine one’s 
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own industry by technological combination is not at all granted. Many are the stories of 
M&A failures in the private sector; take, for example, Daimler-Chrysler in the automotive 
industry and the failed merger Telit between telecommunication companies Italtel and 
Telectra in Italy. 
The control of different sources of knowledge diversity as reported by ST’s Pistorio is 
again significant. Lastly, one must note that the two SOEs are competing in industries not 
favorable to private companies from the same countries, e.g. computers’ components 
manufacturer in France, and more broadly capital-intensive, high-technologies in Italy. 
Whether it is not the aim of this research to prove a supposed greater efficiency of this model 
with respect to private sector, it certainly is to suggest SOEs as mechanism with a great 
potential to start the engine of innovation.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
SOEs were established in different times to reach a variety of objectives. Historical 
analysis and the economic literature offer a solid framework to understand their rationale and 
the role they have been played (Millward, 2010). From an empirical perspective, SOEs still 
do represent a key component of modern economies. This holds true both in newly developed 
countries–where SOEs continue to cover the lion’s share in State managed economies–as 
well as in several Western economies, despite the privatization wave that occurred in the 
‘80s. 
SOEs have been investigated from several angles, mainly in reference to the 
traditional rationales that support their existence and their performances A few exceptions 
notwithstanding (e.g. Tõnurist and Karo, 2016), the vast majority of studies has not focussed 
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on the role of SOEs in innovation systems and technological development. This is quite 
surprising due to the increasing popularity of the ‘entrepreneurial state’ approach that 
highlights the centrality of governments and public policies in sustaining and implementing 
innovation processes (Mazzucato et al., 2013).  According to this approach, governments and 
public policies bear most of the risk. They invest in long-term, basic research, whose results 
are available to private companies. Without the generous efforts of public institutions, private 
companies would not have been able to introduce breakthrough products. The case study of 
iPhone is purposely used to demonstrate the high indebtedness of private companies to public 
research. 
The ‘entrepreneurial State approach, with the exception of public banks, does not 
consider SOEs as a key component of the innovation processes. In a significant number of 
countries, data tell a different story (OECD, 2005). Our study suggests to analyse the role of 
the State from a more analytical perspective: the state can act as an entrepreneur–following 
the above mentioned approach–in different ways. Setting up SOEs is not the same as building 
research centres or other public initiatives. SOEs are companies. They can set up proper 
routines and organizational practices that are crucial for producing new knowledge and for 
innovation. 
To shed full light on the role of State as entrepreneur, we need a thorough 
investigation of SOEs constituencies–compared to available alternatives–and outcome. In a 
large number of newly developed and mature countries, SOEs remain central both from an 
input and output perspective as far as the innovation process is concerned. 
From an input perspective, SOEs not only account for a large share of R&D 
investments, but their researchers represents a significant proportion of the human capital 
committed to innovation. From an output perspective, available evidence–largely based on 
case studies–supports the view that SOEs contributed both to long-term research and 
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commercially oriented research. This is, for instance, the case of STMicroelectronics, who 
succeeded in a very competitive, technology intensive industry. Thales Alenia Space, on the 
other hand, emerged in an industry characterized by long-tem, public projects. As any 
organization, SOEs have tried to comply with external environment, in order to reduce their 
dependence. The two cases we have presented bear evidence of varieties of external 
conditions SOEs have met. SOEs have been facing not only favourable market conditions, as 
in the case of heavy regulated industries, but also very severe and competitive ones. Although 
evidence on this matter is largely anecdotal and based on case studies (Antonelli at al., 2014), 
it is not too much of a leap to argue that SOEs–as a specific form of public support–have 
been able to play a pivotal role as far as research and innovation are concerned. Still, SOEs 
are represented as ‘second best’: a large part of the existing literature argues that SOEs are 
comparatively less efficient than private owned enterprises (POE) both when governments 
are benevolent and malevolent (Belloc, 2014). Understanding under which conditions SOEs 
were able to perform successfully–as in the cases we have examined–could be highly 
beneficial, as we need to go beyond pure statements of intent.  
There are good reasons to conclude that the ‘pure effect of state ownership on 
innovation should be positive’ (Belloc, 2014, 834). However, existing support of the positive 
effects of State intervention (not SOEs, as they are treated as interchangeable forms) is 
normally based on general properties such as the ability to deal with risks. More recently, 
scholars have pointed out that public companies might have a superior ability in exchanging 
knowledge through interindustry and intercompany relationships. We share the view that 
SOEs might be comparatively better equipped in setting up an effective set of 
interorganizational relations to support innovation. We suggest that this advantage might be 
due not only to the common ownership of several cooperating companies, as in the case of 
IRI (Antonelli et al., 2014) but also to a higher level of managerial autonomy compared to 
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private companies. Under specific conditions, and in the presence of a good alignment 
between managers and political economic decision-makers, SOEs can have more degrees of 
freedom in also establishing relationships with private companies.  
Summing up, the two case studies presented here suggest to replicate and extend the 
investigation about SOEs and innovation. We suggest looking for invariants that can explain 
success and failure of SOEs. We have proposed that one of the successful invariants is the 
combinatorial capability of SOEs in knowledge creation.  Scholars have acknowledged that 
innovative projects are by nature interdisciplinary, thus requiring companies to combine 
pieces of knowledge that can be far away from their mainstream. However, combinatorial 
capabilities leverage and require adequate organizational practices, as well as a sustainable 
organizational design. We posit that these two aspects play a key role in the evolution of 
SOEs and in their capacity to produce valuable knowledge over time. SOEs are not an 
homogeneous set of companies, whose only hallmark is public ownership. Some of them 
were able to produce not only technological, but also organizational, innovation. This 
organizational innovation–that as in the case of ST was accomplished through several waves 
of agreements and mergers–was crucial in making the survival and growth of the company 
possible. Future research will tell whether the components of this organizational innovation 
were exclusively internal or whether they were highly dependent upon a strong alignment 
between the company managers and the government. 
Finally, our research warns about the complexity of the innovation landscape. The 
innovation landscape cannot be reduced to a simple dichotomy based on public intervention 
on one hand and private firms on another hand. Public intervention and private firms have 
different constituencies as far as basic knowledge and innovation is concerned. However, 
they are not homogeneous: public intervention occurs in different organizational ways that 
still need to be deeply examined. States support basic knowledge generation by financing 
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Universities, public research centres, and public-private long-term projects. SOEs are 
therefore a case in point that needs to be comparatively examined. 
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Figure 2: Thales Alenia Space 
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